investigated essential requirements for communities in preference networks. They defined six axioms on community functions, i.e., community detection rules. Though having elegant properties, the practicality of this axiom system is compromised by the intractability of checking two critical axioms, so no nontrivial consistent community function was reported in [Borgs et al., 2016] . By adapting the two axioms in a natural way, we propose two new axioms that are efficiently-checkable. We show that most of the desirable properties of the original axiom system are preserved. More importantly, the new axioms provide a general approach to constructing consistent community functions. We further find a natural consistent community function that is also enumerable and samplable, answering an open problem in the literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Clustering individuals in a social network, called community detection, is a fundamental task in graph mining and has been adequately studied. Community detection has different forms, depending on whether overlapping communities are allowed [Palla et al., 2005; Baumes et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2007; Ahn et al., 2009] , whether hierarchical structures are taken into account [Sibson, 1973] , and in which form of the data is provided, etc. People proposed a number of algorithms to find communities, based on different principles such as spectral clustering [Hoffman, 1973] , density-based methods [Ester et al., 1996] , modularity-based method [Newman, 2006] . No matter which form and which algorithm we choose, a community is usually considered as a group of closely related individuals. However, "a group of closely related individuals" is a rather rough concept, and there does not exist a widely accepted definition of communities.
In this paper, we try to axiomatize the concept of communities. We allow overlapping communities and assume the data is given in a preference network. Kleinberg [2003] developed an axiomatic framework for non-overlapping clusterings and defined clustering functions *Correspondence should be addressed to Xingwu Liu. This work is partially supported by the National Key Reaearch and Development Program of China (2016YFB1000201), National Natural Science Foundation of China (11601375,61420106013) , Science Foundation of Shenzhen City in China (JCYJ20160419152942010), and State Key Laboratory of Software Development Environment Open Fund (SKLSDE-2015ZX-25). whose inputs are a set V of n individuals and pairwise distances between these n individuals and whose output is a partition of these vertices (i.e., overlapping communities are not allowed). He found that three desired clustering axioms (scale-invariance, richness and consistency) cannot be satisfied at the same time.
But this negative result did not prevent researchers from investigating axiomatic aspects of clusterings. Meil [2005] proposed axioms to compare clusterings. Ben-David and Ackerman [2008] introduced axioms on clustering quality measures. Zadeh and Ben-David [2009] presented a unique theorem for clustering and showed that the impossibility result in [Kleinberg, 2003] can be avoided by relaxing one of clustering axioms. Ackerman et al. [2010] introduced several more properties of clustering functions to taxonomize a set of popular clustering algorithmic paradigms and strengthened the impossibility result on these properties. Gollapudi and Sharma [2009] devised an evaluation method to characterize the axioms.
Following this line but in a more general sense, Borgs et al. [2016] recently initiated the axiomization of overlapping communities over preference networks. A preference network is a finite set of individuals each having a preference indicating his/her affinity with others. As an expressive model, it covers graphs, a structure that is commonly used in the field of community detection. Borgs et al. [2016] proposed a system of six axioms for community functions and showed various properties of this system.
Among the properties, the lattice structure and the intersection lemma are most striking, because they serve as a guideline to construct desirable community functions. Specifically, the lattice structure means that the axioms satisfying all the six axioms form a lattice under the natural "∪" and "∩" operations. Borgs et al. also identified the bottom (the minimum, called C cliq ) and the top (the maximum, called C comp ) of this lattice. The intersection lemma claims that a community function satisfies all the axioms if and only if it is the intersection of C comp and a community function satisfying four axioms which are simple and easy to conform. The significance of the intersection lemma is that it paves a way to construct a community function satisfying all the axioms, while the lattice structure enables to derive more such community functions on this basis.
However, Borgs et al. [2016] did not construct any nontrivial community function satisfying all the axioms. This is mainly due to the fact that it is coNP-complete to check two of the axioms, namely Group Stability (GS ) and Self-Approval (SA). Furthermore, GS and SA play critical roles in this axiomization for two reasons. First, only they cover the stability of communities, while an unstable community does not make sense, especially in the context of preference networks. As an analogue, consider the stable matching problem where affinity among the players is determined by their preferences and the stability of matchings is the focus (see e.g., Gusfield and Irving [1989] ). Second, these two axioms set the top of the lattice. The coNP-completeness of the two most important axioms surely compromises the practicality of the axiom system.
On this ground, we make an effort to improve the axiom system in [Borgs et al., 2016] and construct desired community functions. Our contributions are fourfold. 1) We show that axiom SA can degenerate so as to be checkable in polynomial time, leaving the axiom system equivalent. 2) We propose an efficiently checkable alternative axiom SGS to the original GS . The modification is natural, and preserves all the good properties of the original axiom system. 3) We present a general approach to construct nontrivial community functions that conform to the new axiom systems. 4) We find a natural, consistent, constructive, enumerable, and samplable community function, answering an open problem in [Borgs et al., 2016] . Note that both this community function and the just-mentioned general approach remain valid in the original axiom system, but the construction essentially depends on the new axiom SGS .
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we review some necessary notions and notations, and show that SA can be replaced by a simpler axiom. We define a strengthening alternative to the crucial axiom GS in Section III, named SGS . In Section IV, we prove that SGS is efficiently checkable, and various desirable properties of the original axiom system are prereserved. In Section V, we present a systematic approach to finding consistent and constructive community functions, and find an ideal community function. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VI with future works and open problems.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we consider community detection as a task that translates a preference network into a set of communities. First of all, we review the definition of preference networks and the axiom system introduced by Borgs et al. [2016] , and show some properties of the axiom system.
A. Preference networks
A preference network is a finite set of individuals each of which ranks all the individuals (including herself) in (strict) order of preference.
Formally, consider a non-empty set V = {1, 2, . . . , n} and L(V ), the set of all total orders on V .
A total order π ∈ L(V ) is equivalently defined as a bijection
is referred to as the rank of u in π, and we say that π prefers u
A community function is a function C that maps each
is called a community of N defined by C, and the term "defined by C" will be omitted if clear from context.
As an example, consider the community function
Every community S defined by C cliq is called a clique 1 . Roughly speaking, a clique is a subset of individuals preferring each other to those not in the subset.
Example 1: We consider two families in a village and each family has three members. The members in a family have the same preference and they prefer their own family members to other villagers. In this case, every family is a community. Actually preference frameworks have been used in various occasions, e.g., voting [Gale and Shapley, 1962; Gusfield and Irving, 1989; Roth, 1984a] , network routing [Rekhter and Li, 1994; Caesar and Rexford, 2005] , and coalition formation in collaborative games [Brams et al., 2003; Roth, 1984b] . Balcan et al. [2013] further elaborated on how the concept of preference networks properly models social networks and why it essentially captures their underlying community structures. Borgs et al. [2016] proposed six axioms for community functions. They are included here for the paper to be selfcontaining. Let's arbitrarily fix a non-empty finite set V and a community function C. This axiom means that whether S is a community is determined by the preference profile rather than by labels of the individuals.
B. Existing axioms
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity(Mon)): Let S ⊆ V , and Π, Π be two preference profiles on V . If u πs v ⇒ u π s v for ∀s, u ∈ S and ∀v ∈ V , then S ∈ C(N ) ⇒ S ∈ C(N ), where N = (V, Π) and N = (V, Π ).
Intuitively, monotonicity means that if the change of the preference profile does not decrease the ranking of any member of a community and preserves the relative ranking among the members, then the community remains. This is reasonable since the affinity among the members of the community is improved after the preference profile is changed.
Axiom 3 (Embedding(Emb)): Given two preference networks N = (V, Π) and
Intuitively, though V is embedded into V , its preferences are not influenced. Hence it is reasonable that communities inside V are formed independently of individuals outside V .
Axiom 4 (World Community(WC)):
This axiom is self-explanatory. Before introducing the remaining two axioms, the concept of preference should be extended to group-preference 2 so that equal-sized sets can be compared. Given a preference network N = (V, Π) and non-empty disjoint sets G, G ⊆ V of the same size, we say that
For example, in the preference network in Example 1, {3, 4} π2 {5, 6} since 3 π2 5 and 4 π2 6. But {3, 4} π5 {5, 6} does not hold, because 5 π5 3 and 6 π5 3.
A set S ⊆ V is called self -approving with respect to Π if for any S ⊆ V − S with |S | = |S|, S is not group-preferred to S by some s ∈ S. S is called group-stable with respect to Π if for any non-empty G S and G ⊆ V −S with |G | = |G|, G is not group-preferred to G by some s ∈ S − G. Roughly speaking, a set is group-stable if no subset agrees to leave and join another set.
For instance, consider again the preference network in Example 1. The set S = {2, 5} is not group-stable, since there exist G = {2} and G = {4} such that 5 ∈ S−G group-prefers G to G. Actually, S is not self -approving either, because for any s ∈ S, s group-prefers {1, 4} to S.
Axiom 5 (Self-Approval(SA)): For any preference network N = (V, Π), if S ∈ C(N ), then S is self-approving with respect to Π.
Axiom 6 (Group Stability(GS)): Given a preference network N = (V, Π), if S ∈ C(N ), then S is group-stable with respect to Π.
There exist community functions satisfying all the axioms, e.g., C cliq and C comp (N ) = {S ⊆ V : S is self-approving and group-stable}.
C. Properties
Borgs et al. [2016] showed that this axiom system has nice properties. The most impressive ones include the intersection lemma and the lattice structure.
Lemma 1 (Lattice, [Borgs et al., 2016] ): Under the operations ∩ and ∪, the community functions satisfying A, Mon, Emb, WC , GS , and SA form a lattice whose top is C comp and bottom is C cliq .
Due to the lattice structure, given some community functions satisfying all the six axioms, one can construct more such community functions using a mixture of ∩ and ∪ operations.
Lemma 2 (Intersection Lemma, [Borgs et al., 2016] ): For any community function C satisfying A, Mon, Emb and WC , C ∩ C comp satisfies all the six axioms.
By this lemma, designing a community function satisfying all the axioms is reduced to find one satisfying the four axioms, which is relatively easier to be satisfied. However, even we have a community function satisfying the four axioms, it remains hard to check whether a given set is a community, since it is computationally hard to check the key axioms GS and SA.
Theorem 3 ( [Borgs et al., 2016] ): It is coNP-complete to decide whether a subset S ⊆ V is self-approval or groupstable with respect to a preference profile.
Actually, we find that SA can degenerate so as to be efficiently checkable, keeping the axiom system equivalent to the original one. This is because GS almost implies SA, which immediately follows from the next theorem.
Theorem 4: Given a preference network N = (V, Π) and a community S ⊆ V with |S| ≥ 2, if S is group-stable with respect to Π, then it is self-approving with respect to Π. Proof. Suppose that |S| ≥ 2 and S is not self-approving with respect to Π. Then there exists S ⊆ V \ S such that for all individuals s ∈ S, s group-prefers S to S. Fix such a S and arbitrarily choose s ∈ S. Assume that s ∈ S is the least favorite individual in S by the preference of s. We have that s group-prefers S − {s } to S − {s}.
Since |S| ≥ 2, S − {s} is a non-empty set. It follows that S is not group-stable with respect to Π.
Therefore, we present a degenerate version of SA so that it only deals with the case where |S| = 1. The degenerate version is SA : For any preference network
By Theorem 4, any community function conforms with {GS , SA} if and only if it conforms with {GS , SA }. Considering that SA is efficiently checkable, we will use SA instead of SA in the remainder of the paper.
III. STRENGTHENING AXIOM GS
After replacing SA with SA , axiom GS becomes the only difficult-to-check axiom in the axiom system. It is this intractability that causes difficulty in constructing community functions. In order to solve this problem, we modify GS in a natural way, resulting in an efficient-to-check axiom called SGS . Besides, we show that a community function satisfies GS if it satisfies SGS .
A. Weak preferences
The hardness of checking group stability of a subset S is partially rooted at enumerating equal-sized subsets of S and V − S. A natural idea for tackling this problem is to compare subsets of S directly with V − S, rather than with its subsets. The first technical obstacle is to compare subsets of different sizes, so we further extend the concept of preference.
Definition 1 (Weak Preferences):
The preference profile π weakly prefers S to S , denoted by S π S , if π group-prefers the set of the top k elements of S to that of S .
Consider Example 1 again. We can show that individual 4 weakly prefers {4, 1} to {2, 3, 5}. Specifically, since {2, 3, 5} has three individuals and {4, 1} only has two, select the top two individuals {2, 5} from {2, 3, 5} (according to the preference of 4). The result follows because 4 group-prefers {4, 1} to {2, 5}.
It is reasonable to borrow the notation " " from grouppreference, since weak preference is equivalent to group-
The following properties of weak preferences will be frequently used in the rest of this paper. They immediately follow from the definition of weak preference, so the proofs are omitted.
Lemma 5: Given π ∈ L(V ), for any S ⊆ V and S ⊆ U ⊆ V with |S | ≥ |S|, if π weakly prefers S to S, then π weakly prefers U to S.
Lemma 6: Given π ∈ L(V ), for any S, S ⊆ V , if π weakly prefers S to S, then for all T ⊆ S, π weakly prefers S to T .
In Example 1, suppose S = {2, 4} and S = {1, 3}, then individual 4 weakly prefers S to S. Suppose U = {1, 3, 5} and T = {2}, then S ⊆ U and T ⊆ S, which means that individual 4 weakly prefers U to S by Lemma 5 and weakly prefers S to T by Lemma 6.
B. Alternative to GS
Now we are ready to define the alternative SGS (namely strong group stability) to GS .
Consider a preference network N = (V, Π). A set S ⊆ V is called strongly group − stable with respect to Π if for any non-empty G S, there exists s ∈ S − G which does not weakly prefers V − S to G. Strong group-stability differs from group-stability mainly in that weak preference rather than group-preference is used.
Let's arbitrarily fix a community function C. Axiom 7 (SGS): For any preference network N = (V, Π) and any subset S ⊆ V , if S ∈ C(N ), then S is strongly group-stable with respect to Π.
Roughly speaking, GS rules out a community S if there exists a subset T S such that all members of S − T agree to replace T with a common, equal-sized group outside of S, while SGS does so under a weaker condition that essentially captures two facts. First, T can be replaced by a group of a different size. Second, members of S − T might not have a common replacement of T (in case that |V − S| > |T |), but they agree on kicking T out. In this case, it is reasonable to rule out such communities; see the following example.
In Example 1, individual 4 weakly prefers {5, 6} to {1, 2, 3}, which means that {1, 2, 3, 4} is not strongly groupstable and cannot be a community according to SGS . This coincides with commonsense, since 4 tends to leave {1, 2, 3} and join {5, 6}. However, {1, 2, 3, 4} is group-stable and is a candidate of community in the original axiom system.
Theorem 7: For any community function C, if it satisfies SGS , then it also satisfies GS . Proof. If some community function C satisfies SGS but does not satisfy GS , there must exist a preference network N = (V, Π) and a community S ∈ C(N ) which is strongly groupstable but not group-stable with respect to Π. By the definition of group stability, there are two non-empty subsets T S and T ⊆ V − S such that |T | = |T | and u group-prefers T to T for all individuals u ∈ S − T . By Lemma 5, u weakly prefers V − S to T , meaning that S is not strongly group-stable. A contradiction is reached.
IV. COMPLEXITY AND LATTICE
This section shows that the lattice structure, the intersection lemma, and richness of the axiom system in Borgs et al. [2016] still hold in our axiom system. More importantly, we show that it takes polynomial time to check whether a given community satisfies SGS .
A. Intersection lemma and lattice structure
Let A = {A, Mon, WC , Emb, GS , SA } and SA = {A, Mon, WC , Emb, SGS , SA }. For a collection X ∈ {A, SA} of axioms, a community function is said to be Xconsistent if it conforms with all axioms in X .
We go on with showing that many good properties of A are preserved by SA. An example is the intersection lemma, one of the most important properties of A.
Before introducing the intersection lemma, we define the intersection between community functions. Given two community functions C 1 and C 2 , we define C 1 ∩ C 2 as the community
Then we define three community functions that will be used: C SGS , C SA , and C scomp , which are the maximum community functions satisfying SGS , SA , and both of them, respectively. Formally, given a preference network N = (V, Π),
, and Assume that preference networks N = (V, Π), N = (V, Π ), and community S ∈C(N ) satisfy the condition of Mon, namely, for all s, u ∈ S and v ∈ V , if u πs v then u π s v. The rest of the proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: Since C satisfies Mon and S ∈ C(N ), we immediately have S ∈ C(N ).
Step 2: We prove that S ∈ C scomp (N ) as following. If S is a singleton {s}, then S ∈ C scomp (N ) implies that π s (s) = 1, namely s πs u for any u = s. Hence, s π s u for any u = s and we have S ∈ C scomp (N ).
When |S| > 1, S ∈ C scomp (N ) if and only if S ∈ C SGS (N ), so we only have to prove that S ∈ C SGS (N ). 
Altogether, we have shown that if N, N and S ∈C(N ) satisfy the condition of Mon, then S ∈C(N ). This means thatC satisfies Mon, and the lemma follows immediately.
In some sense, the critical role of the intersection lemma lies in that it provides a normal form of consistent community functions: the intersection of a simple community function with C scomp . Hence finding a SA-consistent community function is reduced to finding a {A, Mon, WC , Emb}-consistent one. This reduction will greatly help us construct desirable community functions, as shown in Section V-B. The intersection lemma also leads to the lattice structure of SA-consistent community functions, which is also true for A and is one of the most striking results in [Borgs et al., 2016] .
Theorem 9: Let C be the class of all SA-consistent community functions. The algebraic structure T = {C, ∪, ∩} forms a bounded lattice whose top and bottom are C scomp and C cliq , respectively.
The proof of Theorem 9 is straightforward by the intersection lemma (Lemma 8) and the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Borgs et al. [2016] , so the detail is omitted.
The significance of the lattice structure lies in that given some SA-consistent community functions, one can produce more such community functions by a mixture of ∩ and ∪ operations.
According to the lattice structure, the richness of SAconsistent community functions is to some extent determined by the difference between C scomp and C cliq . Actually, the difference is significant, with evidence from the number of communities. On the one hand, for any preference network N , the size of C cliq (N ) is linear, by Lemma 19. On the other hand, an example inspired by [Borgs et al., 2016] indicates that the size C scomp (N ) can be exponential for some preference network N .
Lemma 10: For any positive integer n, there exists a preference network N = (V, Π) with |V | = n such that |C scomp (N )| ≥ 2 n/2 . Proof. Let m = n/2 . Let H = {h 1 , h 2 , . .., h m } be a set of m heroes, S = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s m } be a set of m sidekicks, and h 1 , h 2 , ..., h m , s i , s 1 , ...s i−1 , s i+1 , ..., s m ] . Let Π be the preference profile consisting of all π hi 's and π si 's. Consider the preference network N = (V, Π). Arbitrarily choose a subset U ⊆ S. We will prove that H ∪U ∈ C SGS (N ).
For contradiction, suppose H ∪ U / ∈ C SGS (N ). Then there exists a non-empty set T H ∪U such that V −(H ∪U ) πw T for all w ∈ (H ∪U )−T . Since any individual in H is always preferred to any individual in S, it must hold that T ⊂ U ⊂ S, implying that H ⊆ (H∪U )−T . Therefore, V −(H∪U
Since the size of C cliq (N ) is at most linear (proved in Lemma 19), Lemma 10 suggests that the collection of SAconsistent community functions may be rich and the lattice may be far from collapsing. The above lemma also implies that the though SGS is stronger than GS , the restriction is not too much.
B. SGS is efficient to check
Now we present the most important property of SGS , that it can be efficiently checked. This is shown constructively, through an algorithm inspired by the following observation.
Consider a preference network N = (V, Π) and a subset S V . Suppose that S / ∈ C SGS (N ). There must exist a nonempty set T S that all individuals in S − T weakly prefer V − S to T . If we extend any set U ⊆ T by adding any u ∈ S that does not weakly prefer V − S to U , Lemma 6 indicates that no individual in S − T can be added since all individuals in S − T weakly prefer V − S to U . So, if we happen to start with U = {u} for some u ∈ T and extend U step-by-step, the process must stop before U = S.
Based on this observation, we design an algorithm which for each individual u ∈ S, initializes U to be {u}, and iteratively extends U by adding an individual in S that does not weakly prefer V − S to U . If and only if we get some U S that cannot be extended any more, decide S / ∈ C SGS (N ). The details are specified in Algorithm 1.
We illustrate how Algorithm 1 works using the preference network in Example 1. Let S be {1, 2, 3, 4}. At the beginning, u is 1 at Line 2 and U = {1}. Individual 2 is added to U at Line 7 since individual 2 does not weakly prefer V − S = {5} return T rue to U . Then U = {1, 2}, and individual 3 is added to U since individual 3 does not weakly prefer V − S = {5} to U . Now U = {1, 2, 3} and S − U = {4}. Because individual 4 weakly prefers {5} to U , the algorithm returns F alse at Line 9. Now we prove the correctness of Algorithm 1 and show that its running time is O(|S| 4 ). Lemma 11: Given a preference network N = (V, Π) and S ⊆ V , it is in time O |S| 4 to decide whether S ∈ C SGS (N ).
Proof. Correctness:
Suppose S / ∈ C SGS (N ). There must exist a non-empty set T S that V − S πs T for all s ∈ S − T . Note that the F or loop enumerates all u ∈ S. If the algorithm terminates before any u ∈ T is chosen at line 3, it surely outputs F alse. Otherwise, we eventually have u ∈ T at line 3. By Lemma 6, U ⊆ T always holds. Hence, the W hile loop will reach a state where U = S and the condition at Line 5 is false. Then, the algorithm also returns F alse.
On the other hand, if the algorithm returns F alse, all individuals in S − U weakly prefer V − S to U , which means that S / ∈ C SGS (N ).
Complexity:
There are two nested loops in Algorithm 1 and each loop runs at most |S| times. The complexity of checking the condition at line 5 is O(|S| 2 ). So, the complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(|S| 4 ).
We are ready to show that C scomp is efficiently checkable, in contrast to the coNP-completeness of checking the membership of C comp .
Theorem 12: Given a preference network N = (V, Π) and S ⊆ V , it takes O(|S| 4 ) time to decide whether S ∈ C scomp (N ) or not. Proof. If |S| ≥ 2, it is equivalent to decide whether S ∈ C SGS (N ), which can be done in O(|S| 4 ) by Algorithm 1.
By Lemma 11, it takes O(|S| 4 ) time to decide whether S ∈ C SGS , which means that it is in O(|S| 4 ) to decide whether S ∈ C scomp .
Otherwise, S is a singleton {s}. In this case, S ∈ C scomp (N ) if and only if π s (s) = 1, which can be decided in constant time. Borgs et al. [2016] proposed an open problem: Is there an ideal community function in their axiom system A? In this section, we first solve the problem in the our axiom system SA by constructing such a community function. Since SA is stronger than A, this community function is also A-consistent, answering the original open problem.
V. CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITY FUNCTIONS

A. Consistent, constructive community functions
A community function C is said to be constructive if for any preference network N = (V, Π), the membership of C(N ) can be checked in polynomial-time in |V |. Constructive community functions are desirable, but it is not easy to figure out a natural, nontrivial, A-consistent one (nontrivial means different from C cliq ). Borgs et al. [2016] mainly considered two families of candidates, namely C cliq(g) and C harmonious(λ) with non-negative function g and real number λ ∈ [0, 1]. They showed that though C cliq(g) ∩C comp and C harmonious(λ) ∩C comp are A-consistent, they are not constructive in general. The definitions of C cliq(g) and C harmonious(λ) are presented here in order to make this paper self-contained.
Definition 2 (C cliq(g) ): Given a non-negative function g :
In the context of SA, we have the following theorem which helps finding consistent constructive community function. This theorem greatly simplifies the task of finding SAconsistent constructive community functions, since it is relatively easier to find a constructive one that is {A, Mon, Emb, WC }-consistent.
For example, for any non-negative function g and real number λ ∈ [0, 1], both C cliq(g) and C harmonious(λ) conform with A, Mon, Emb, and WC . Hence, Theorem 13 immediately implies the following lemma.
Lemma 14: The community functions C cliq(g) ∩ C scomp and C harmonious(λ) ∩ C scomp are SA-consistent and constructive, for any non-negative function g and any real number λ ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, by Theorem 7, the two families of community functions in Lemma 14 are also A-consistent and constructive.
In the next subsection we go further in this direction and find a community function having more nice properties, solving the open problem posed by Borgs et al. [2016] .
B. C grow : an ideal community function
An ideal community function should not only be constructive, but also allows to efficiently enumerate the communities. Borgs et al. [2014] (the full version of [Borgs et al., 2016] ) defined two more properties for community functions C:
• Samplable: given a preference network N = (V, Π), one can randomly sample any community from C(N ) in time P (|V |), where P (·) is a polynomial function; • Enumerable: given a preference network N = (V, Π), one can enumerate C(N ) in time O(n k |C(N )|) for some constant k. Borgs et al. [2016] proposed the following open problem. Problem 1 (ACCSE): Find a natural nontrivial community function that is A-consistent, constructive, samplable, and enumerable.
We solve the ACCSE problem in this subsection. Actually, the following stronger problem is solved.
Problem 2 (SACCSE): Find a natural community function that allows nontrivially overlapping communities and is SAconsistent, constructive, samplable, and enumerable.
The basic idea of our solution is to reduce the problem according to Theorem 13. Namely, if we find a community function C satisfying A, Mon, WC , and Emb, then C ∩C scomp is SA-consistent. Furthermore, if C is enumerable and |C(N )| is polynomial in |V | for all preference networks N = (V, Π), C ∩ C scomp will be enumerable and samplable.
But how to find such a community function C? Our approach is inspired by the method in [Palla et al., 2005] . Roughly speaking, starting with best communities, i.e.,, cliques in a preference network, we produce new good communities as many as possible by extending existing communities. Intuitively, this growing process conforms with the formation of communities in real life (for example, consider how friendship forms). The key of the approach is properly defining good communities. For this end, we consider the following community function which is adapted from C harmonious (λ) .
Definition 4 (C harmon ): Given a preference network N = (V, Π) and a subset S ⊆ V , S ∈ C harmon (N ) if for all u ∈ S and v ∈ V − S, more than half of the members of S − {u} prefer u to v.
The following lemma shows that C harmon is efficiently checkable.
Lemma 15: Given a preference network N = (V, Π) and a set S ⊆ V , it takes O(|V | 3 ) time to determine whether S is in C harmon (N ). Proof. For each individual u in S and each individual v in V − S, it takes O(|S|) time to determine whether a majority of S − {u} prefer u to v, which means that it takes O(|V | 3 ) time to determine whether S ∈ C harmon (N ) or not.
Based on the idea preceding Definition 4, we define C grow in terms of Algorithm 2, i.e., for any preference network N ,
Algorithm 2 is self-explanatory. We now show that the size of C grow (N ) and the time complexity of Algorithm 2 are both polynomial in |V |.
Lemma 16 while C is not empty do
5:
Arbitrarily choose an element S from C 6:
for u in V − S do 8:
if S ∈ C harmon (N ) then 10:
return R
Proof. According to the definition of
. This means that for any S ∈ C, it can be extended by at most one u ∈ V − S in the for loop. Lemma 16 immediately indicates that C grow is enumerable, samplable, and constructive. However, C grow is not SAconsistent. For example, in the preference network of Example 1, the set {1, 2, 3, 4} is a community defined by C grow , but it is not strongly group-stable since individual 4 weakly prefers {5, 6} to {1, 2, 3}.
Fortunately, C grow ∩ C scomp is a community function satisfying all the requirements in Problem 2.
Theorem 17: C grow ∩C scomp is a natural community function that allows nontrivially overlapping communities and solves both the SACCSE problem and the ACCSE problem. Proof. By Lemma 16, we know that C grow is enumerable, samplable, and constructive, and that the size of C grow (N ) is polynomial for any preference network N . Since C scomp is constructive, C grow ∩ C scomp is enumerable, samplable, and constructive.
It is straightforward to show that C grow satisfies A, Mon, WC , and Emb. According to Lemma 8, C grow ∩ C scomp is SA-consistent.
By Lemmas 19 and 20, C grow ∩ C scomp = C cliq , namely, C grow ∩ C scomp is nontrivial.
As a result, C grow ∩ C scomp solves the SACCSE problem. By Theorem 7, it also solves the ACCSE problem. Now we prove Lemmas 19 and 20 just used. First, recall a property of C cliq .
Lemma 18 ( [Borgs et al., 2016] ): Given a preference network N = (V, Π) and
Lemma 19 Now we view T (N ) as a rooted tree whose root is the vertex corresponding to V .
The rooted tree T (N ) has two properties. First, every inner vertex has degree at least 2. Second, the leaves are disjoint subsets of V , implying that there are at most |V | leaves. It is easy to see that such a tree has at most |V | − 1 inner vertices. As a result, the number of vertices of T (N ) is at most 2|V |− 1, meaning that the size of C cliq (N ) is at most 2|V | − 1.
Lemma 20: For any finite set V , there exists a preference profile Π such that the size of
This lemma will be proved constructively. Before presenting the proof, we show the basic idea of the construction, and briefly explain how the construction algorithm works.
Intuitively, to maximize the size of C grow ∩ C scomp (N ), we should maximize the size of C cliq (N ). Besides, in order to absorb as many individuals as possible, for any two members inside a community, they should have the same preference order on the individuals outside of the community. Following the above idea, we design Algorithm 3 which outputs the desired preference profile. Let's first introduce the notations.
Throughout the algorithm, σ stands for an arbitrarily fixed total order on V . For any S ⊆ V , σ| S is defined to be the total order restricted to S. For example, if S = {1, 2, 3, 5} ⊂ V = {1, 2, ... 5} and σ = [1, 4, 3, 2, 5] , then σ| S is [1, 3, 2, 5]. For a preference network N = (V, Π) and v ∈ V , we use Π| v to stand for the preference of v in N . For any disjoint finite sets W , W and preferences π ∈ L(W ), π ∈ L(W ), the concatenation of π with π , denoted by π • π , is defined to be the preference π ∈ L(W ∪ W ) as follows: ∀w ∈ W , π(w ) = π (w ) and ∀w ∈ W , π(w ) = |W | + π (w ). Intuitively, π locally preserves the ordering of π and π on W and W , but globally prefers W to W .
Algorithm 3 Find a preference profile with big
for v ∈ V 1 do 8:
for v ∈ V 2 do 10:
The procedure GetP rof ile(V ) is in a divide-and-conquer style. It divides V into two subsets V 1 and V 2 which are balanced in size. Then it recursively determine the preference profiles Π 1 and Π 2 on V 1 and V 2 , respectively. Finally, the preferences in Π 1 and Π 2 are extended, resulting in the preference profile Π on V . The extension of each preference in Π i is by concatenating it with σ| V3−i , for i ∈ {1, 2}. Now we prove that the preference profile Π meets the requirement of Lemma 20. Proof. Fix V throughout this proof. Let N = (V, Π) with Π being the preference profile found by the algorithm. For any set U ⊆ V that appears in the recursion, if |U | > 1, the algorithm divides it into U 1 and
is linear in the size of U , we make two claims.
Claim 1:
. This claim can be proved in two steps. First, by Algorithm 3, each clique C ∈ C cliq (N ) ∩ 2 U with C = U must satisfy either C ⊆ U 1 or C ⊆ U 2 . Recalling the for loop of Algorithm 2, we have that if S ∈ C grow (N ) is obtained by extending S U 1 with some
Second, recall how Algorithm 2 extends
As a result, Claim 1 holds. Claim 2: If U = V , there are at most one community in
. This claim can be proved as follows. Arbitrarily choose S ∈ (C grow (N )∩2 U )\(2 U1 ∪2 U2 ). We begin with the case U 1 ⊆ S.
By Algorithm 3 and the characterization of (C grow (N ) ∩ 2 U ) \ (2 U1 ∪ 2 U2 ) in the proof of Claim 1, we have v πu w for any w ∈ V − S. Considering that |V − S| ≥ |V − U | ≥ |U | − 1 ≥ |T | and V − S πu T , it holds that w πu v for some w ∈ V − S, which is a contradiction. Hence, U 1 ⊆ T .
Second, arbitrarily choose u ∈ S − T ⊆ U . By Algorithm 3, for any v ∈ U, w ∈ V − U , it holds that v πu w. Recall that V − S πu T and |V − S| ≥ |T |, so for any v ∈ T , there is a w v ∈ V − S such that w v πu v. Because V − S = (U 2 − S)∪(V −U ), T = (T −U 1 )∪U 1 , and |U 2 −S| < |U 2 | ≤ |U 1 |, we have w v ∈ V − U for some v ∈ T , contradictory to the fact that v πu w for any v ∈ T ⊆ U, w ∈ V − U .
Therefore, for any S ∈ (C grow (N ) ∩ 2 U ) \ (2 U1 ∪ 2 U2 ), if U 1 ⊆ S, we get S ∈ C scomp (N ).
Likewise, if U 2 ⊆ S, we can show that S ∈ C scomp (N ) except the unique case S = {u} ∪ U 2 with u ∈ U 1 .
As a result, by Claim 1, Claim 2 holds. Claims 1 and 2 implies that g(V ) = O(|V |) and for any set U V that appears in the recursion of Algorithm 3, g(U ) = Θ(|U |). A simple calculation indicates that F (V ) = Θ(|V | log |V |).
Remark 1: Actually, Borgs et al. [2016] did not define enumerable or samplable community functions, but we find the definitions in [Borgs et al., 2014] , the arXiv version of [Borgs et al., 2016] . Borgs et al. [2016] also defined the stability and the open problem required that the community function has stable communities which are samplable and enumerable. We find that even C cliq is not stable under their definition, so we just ignore it.
Remark 2: Lemma 8 (the intersection lemma) plays an important role in solving the problem SACCSE because C grow itself does not satisfy SGS . To see this, consider Example 1. Since {1, 2, 3} is in C cliq (N ) and {1, 2, 3, 4} is in C harmon (N ), {1, 2, 3, 4} is in C grow (N ), while it is not in C SGS (V, Π) because π 4 weekly prefers {5} to {1, 2, 3}.
According to Theorem 3, if one uses axioms GS and SA, then it is coNP-complete to determine whether a given community is in C grow ∩ C GS ∩ C SA (N ). This example also shows the importance of getting rid of the computational difficulties of checking the key axioms of GS and SA.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focus on axiomization of network community detection. As far as we know, only one paper [Borgs et al., 2016] in this line studied overlapping communities, and it was on a general structure -preference networks. Among the six axioms in [Borgs et al., 2016] , two of them (GS and SA) play a critical role, but the hardness in checking them compromises the practicality of the axiom system. We showed that in the context of the axiom system, SA can be equivalently replaced by a degenerate version SA . We also naturally modified axiom GS to a stronger version called SGS . We showed that both SGS and SA can be checked in polynomial time, and most of the properties of the original system are preserved. Furthermore, by the intersection lemma, we found two constructive and SA-consistent community functions. We also found an SA-consistent, constructive, samplable and enumerable community function that allows nontrivially overlapping communities, thus answering to an open problem in [Borgs et al., 2016] .
Although the current work is purely theoretical, it would be beneficial to evaluate and improve existing community detection algorithms in the framework of our axioms. This is a direction of our future work.
Another direction is to further improve the axiom system. Before Lemma 10, we discussed the richness, namely, many community functions might be consistent with the axioms. This seems advantageous since good community functions are not likely to be precluded. However, selectivity should also be considered, otherwise users would be burdened with selecting desirable community functions from too many candidates. Can we further improve the system of axiom by making a better trade-off between richness and selectivity?
